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Abstract
"Beauty contests" are well-studied, dominance-solvable games that generate two
interesting results. First, most behavior does not conform to the unique Nash
equilibrium. Second, there is considerable unexplained heterogeneity in behavior.
In this work, we evaluate the relationship between beauty contest behavior and
cognitive ability. We ￿nd that subjects with high cognitive ability exhibit behavior
that is closer to the Nash equilibrium. We examine this ￿nding through the prism
of economic and biological theory.
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Economics uses mathematical models to predict human behavior. The level of analytic
sophistication in these models appears to exceed that of the conscious mental processes
being modeled. Is it reasonable to predict human behavior using models that require
analysis beyond the ability of all but a few people?
Yes, is the conventional response; complex mathematics underlie human economic
behavior, but people need not do any conscious calculations to reach equilibrium. In a
famous analogy, Friedman and Savage asked their readers to consider the problem facing
an expert billiard player: ￿the billiard player made his shots as if he knew the formulas...
[and] could make the lightning calculations from the formulas.￿(Friedman and Savage
1948, p 298). Economic behavior, in this view, is produced by an optimizing process of
potentially great complexity that need not be directly accessible to the actors.
Economic models commonly omit two nuances contained in Freidman and Savage￿ s
original work. First, Friedman and Savage￿ s billiards player is explicitly listed as an expert,
which implies a role for learning and suggests that the ￿as if￿does not apply to all people.
Second, Friedman and Savage, and later Friedman (1953), use examples where it could
plausibly argued that selective forces, such as markets, support an outcome in which
economic behavior is reasonably approximated by a rationality assumption. If selection is
central to optimal behavior then application of the ￿as if￿should be conditioned upon the
selective pressures that are relevant to a particular context. In practice, many economic
models eschew such nuances, and utilize a ￿na￿ve as if￿that assumes all people e⁄ortlessly
calculate the optimal course of action, and follow that course.
The ￿behavioral school￿has mounted a critique of the na￿ve ￿as if￿assumption, sup-
ported by divergences between behavior predicted by standard economic theory and ac-
2tual human behavior as observed inside and outside laboratories (Kahneman and Tversky
1979; Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Thaler 1992). The term ￿anomaly￿is used to de-
scribe human behavior that is ￿di¢ cult to reconcile ... within the [standard economic]
paradigm￿(Dawes and Thaler 1988, p 187).
One well-documented behavioral anomaly is the observation that almost no people act
as predicted by standard economic theory in a simple strategic situation called a ￿beauty
contest￿(Nagel 1995). In the beauty contest, people compete by simultaneously choosing
a number from some ￿nite range, commonly 0 to 100. The winner is the person whose
selection is closest to some fraction, p, of the average of all the choices. Ties are either
resolved randomly or by dividing the prize equally among the winners. In a commonly
studied variant of a beauty contest, p is strictly greater than 0 and strictly less than 1,
which implies a unique Nash equilibrium where all choices are identically zero.
In economic models, the path to equilibrium is often unspeci￿ed. Moulin did the
￿rst analysis of the beauty contest to illustrate that Nash equilibrium can sometimes be
found by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies (Moulin 1986). Consider, for
example, the beauty contest with a range of 0 to 100, and with the parameter, p, set to
0.5. A choice of 50 weakly dominates any selection higher than 50, thus if people eliminate
weakly dominated strategies, the interval of choice becomes [0, 50]. However, if all people
remove choices above 50, and anticipate others will also, the same logic reduces the range
to [0, 25]. In general, after n levels of iteration, the interval shrinks to [0, 100pn], which
for 0 < p < 1 converges to the single point 0. It can be shown that this Nash equilibrium
is unique.
Therefore, if all people in a beauty contest behaved as predicted by economic the-
ory, then each would choose 0. The ￿rst beauty contest experiment documented large
and persistent deviations from this prediction (Nagel 1995). Further research has con-
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(Camerer 2003; Chou et al. 2007; Du⁄y and Nagel 1997; Ho, Camerer and Wiegelt 1998).
Repetition tends to produce convergence toward the Nash equilibrium, in some studies
larger stakes are associated with behavior that is closer to equilibrium, and substantial
deviations from Nash equilibrium have been documented in a variety of di⁄erent subject
pools. Finally, experimental subjects typically engage in fewer than 3 rounds of iterated
dominance (as inferred from their choices).
A series of experiments have sought to expand the scale and scope of the subject pool
by running ￿￿eld￿ beauty contests in the popular media (Bosch-DomŁnech and Nagel
1997a, 1997b; Selten and Nagel,1997, 1998; Thaler 1997a,1997b). These experiments
had thousands of participants and drew from a much broader (albeit uncontrolled) range
of subjects. These large-scale ￿eld studies con￿rmed the earlier work in reporting het-
erogeneous behavior, and almost no subjects who conformed to the Nash equilibrium
(Bosch-DomŁnech et al. 2002).
In summary, the beauty contest is a relatively simple strategic situation, with a unique
Nash equilibrium that is exhibited by almost no one in a wide range of laboratory and
￿eld settings. It has been suggested that the failure of Nash equilibrium, the core solution
concept in economics, to predict behavior in this simple strategic setting might have broad
rami￿cations. Why do people fail to conform to Nash equilibrium in the beauty contest
and what are the implications?
One explanation may be found in the computational complexity of ￿nding equilibrium.
If some individuals have di¢ culty performing the ￿lightening calculations￿of Friedman
and Savage, at least in a certain class of problems, this may account for the failure of the
Nash equilibrium to be observed in this simple experiment. The original beauty contest
paper pursued one such cognitive explanation; Nagel introduced a framework she labeled
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1995; Simon 1955). In this framework, people vary in the order of their beliefs about
others￿beliefs. In each case, level k+1 behavior is a best response to a world ￿lled only
with level-k people. Nagel￿ s framework has been formalized and re￿ned in a variety of
papers, both in so-called level-k models (Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006; Stahl 1996,
1998), as well as related cognitive hierarchy models (Camerer, Ho and Chong 2004).
This depth of reasoning view suggests that beauty contest participants may be acting
rationally, given their beliefs about the distribution of people who engage in k steps of
thinking, but their beliefs about the distribution may be biased. Beauty contest behavior
provides some support for this characterization. For example, the modal choices for several
of the large ￿eld experiments with p = 2/3 were 33 and 22 (Bosch-DomŁnech et al. 2002).
33 is the level-1 choice, de￿ned as a best response to a world ￿lled with level-0 people
who choose randomly within [0, 100]. Similarly, 22 is the level-2 choice that would win in
a world full of level 1 people, each selecting 33.
The deviation between human behavior and that predicted by the core equilibrium
concept suggests a re￿nement of the theory. Two sorts of modi￿cations seem plausible.
First, the ability to implicitly and non-consciously calculate optimal behavior might vary
with problem type and framing. In the discussion section we invoke the natural sciences
literature to suggest that the rationality assumption might be expected to work well, even
for computationally intensive tasks if the setting lines up appropriately with naturally-
selected decision mechanisms (Cosmides and Tooby 1994; Mayr 1961; Tinbergen 1963,
1968). Cognitive ability might play a central role in certain types of economic decisions,
and thus explain heterogeneous, non-equilibrium behavior.
There is a nascent literature on cognitive ability and economic behavior. Small-stakes
loss aversion and impatience are associated with lower cognitive ability in a series of related
5studies (Benjamin and Brown 2006; Dohmen et al. 2007; Frederick, 2005). Studies of
simple bargaining games report inconsistent relationships between behavior and cognitive
ability (Brandstatter and Guth 2002; Millet and Dewitte 2006). In repeated prisoner￿ s
dilemmas, a meta-study reports higher levels of cooperation conducted at universities
that admit students with higher standardized test scores (Jones 2006). Finally, one recent
study examined the relationship between various measures of cognition and dominance
violations (Rydval et al. 2007). The authors found that reasoning errors were associated
with lower performance on a test of working memory.
However, attempts to study the causal role of cognitive ability can be di¢ cult to
di⁄erentiate from preference-based explanations. For example, small-scale loss aversion,
high discount rates, and cooperation could be produced by perfect ￿ as if￿optimization
of loss-averse, impatient, and other-regarding preferences (Bolton 1991; Fehr et al. 2002;
Fehr and Schmid, 1999; Gintis 2000; Rabin, 1993), although it is argued that some of
these results require implausible preferences (Rabin 2000).
Another clue to the role of cognitive ability comes from ￿cognitive load￿experiments
that ask subjects to engage in multiple tasks simultaneously. In one study, higher cognitive
loads are associated with higher levels of small stakes loss aversion and lower levels of
patience (Benjamin and Brown 2006). In a study of forecasting ability, high cognitive
load degrades performance, but this e⁄ect can be reversed by higher ￿nancial incentives
(Rydval 2007). More generally, it has been argued that ￿rewards reduce the variance of
the data around the predicted outcomes.￿(Smith and Walker 1993, p. 245), a ￿nding
consistent with a related meta-study (Camerer and Hogarth 1999).
Further evidence on the role of cognitive ability comes from the centipede game, which
has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium that is observed with a frequency under 10%
in student populations (Binmore 1987; McKelvey and Palfrey 1992). Highlighting the role
6of cognitive ability, one study used high-caliber chess players as subjects in the centipede
game. Among these subjects, 69% stopped at the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium
of the ￿rst node; among the ranked, grand masters 100% of subjects stopped at the ￿rst
node (Palacios-Huertay and Volijz 2006). Choosing the sub-game perfect equilibrium in
the centipede game requires backward induction and the common knowledge of rationality
(Aumann and Brandenburger 1995).
The centipede game results highlight the impact of di⁄erent subject pools on behavior.
Interestingly, the vast majority of the existing work on cognitive ability and economic
behavior uses university students as subjects. Because the admissions process uses direct
and indirect measures of cognitive ability these subjects are not representative of the
population.
Any study involving cognitive ability involves two controversies. First, there is con-
siderable debate of the ability to summarize cognitive ability by a single, general factor,
sometimes called ￿g￿(Spearman 1904). The concept of g is supported by some and cri-
tiqued by others (Plomin and Spinath 2002; Toga and Thompson, 2005). Second, there is
evidence that cognitive ability is heritable (Neisser et al. 1996), but there is debate about
the extent to which it is malleable with respect to environmental intervention (Heckman
1995).
In spite of these unresolved issues, we favor continued research because cognitive ability
scores have high predictive validity for behaviors that are central to economics. These
include high correlations between cognitive ability and wages, education, employment,
and occupation (Cawley, Heckman and Vytlacil 2001), as well as smoking, illegal drug
use, and teen pregnancies (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua 2006). Furthermore, a study
of large stakes retirement decisions ￿nds that lower cognitive ability is correlated with a
preference for lump-sum payments over annuities at discount rates of up to 30% (Warner
7and Pleeter 2001). These relationships are not particularly surprising given that the tests
were designed to predict real world outcomes (Geary 2005).
We contribute to the investigation of cognitive ability and economic behavior with
an experimental study that has the following attributes. First, we directly test cognitive
ability, which we prefer to the use of proxies such as SAT-scores or GPA. Second, we
examine behavior in the beauty contest, a setting without any obvious preference-based
explanation for non-equilibrium behavior, and where the existing literature suggests a role
for cognitive ability via the depth of reasoning analysis. Third, we draw our subject pool
from a Swedish population-based registry, which is an improvement over a subject pool
of students in terms of representativity.
In sharp contrast to the standard economic view that constraints on computational
ability are non-binding, we believe that some economic problems, including the beauty
contest, require mobilization of costly cognitive resources. In particular, measurable dif-
ferences in cognitive ability may in fact underlie di⁄erences in the strategic sophistication
- for instance an individual￿ s ￿ parameter in a cognitive hierarchy model, or her type in
a level k model - subjects exhibit in economic games. Accordingly, we predict that lower
cognitive ability scores will be associated with beauty contest behavior that is farther
from Nash equilibrium.
II METHODS
Subjects played a beauty contest with a range of [0, 100] and the parameter p was set
at 0.5 (See Appendix A for full beauty contest instructions). The cognitive ability test
used is a short, standard psychometric test of general mental ability (Spearman, 1904)
developed by the Swedish psychometric company Psykologif￿rlaget (Sj￿berg, Sj￿berg and
8ForssØn 2006). Subjects had twenty minutes to complete the test, and were noti￿ed with
5 and 1 minutes remaining. The test is divided into three sections on verbal analogies,
logical problems, and mathematical series.
A total of 658 subjects were drawn from a population-based registry in Sweden. Be-
cause the subjects were part of a related study on heritability, all were same sex twins.
Subjects were born between 1960 and 1985, and were solicited by e-mail and recruited in
all major Swedish cities through the summer and fall of 2006. A condition for participation
was that both twin siblings be able to participate.
Subjects were, upon arrival, informed about the general proscription against deception
in economics. They were further noti￿ed that if they felt that there were any ambiguities
in the instructions, they should feel free to ask questions, and questions were answered
privately. We also stressed, both in the written instructions and orally, that answers would
be treated with complete con￿dentiality. Two subjects did not take the test of general
mental ability and these observations were dropped. No subject declined to take part in
the beauty contest. In addition, we obtained subjects￿age, sex, and level of education.
III RESULTS
As hypothesized, higher cognitive ability scores are correlated with decreased distance
from Nash equilibrium in this beauty contest. Visually, this is shown in Figure I where
we plot average beauty contest choice, and 95% con￿dence bands, strati￿ed for each decile
in the cognitive ability distribution. Con￿dence bands are adjusted to take into account
covariation between twins. Subjects in the highest two deciles of cognitive ability have an
average choice that is very near the revenue maximizing number, whereas subjects in the
lowest three deciles have average choices just below 50 (consistent with picking randomly
9within the feasible set).
Multivariate analysis con￿rms the relationship between cognitive ability and beauty
contest behavior (see Table I). Regressing the distance from Nash equilibrium on cognitive
ability and controls which include sex, education and age, the coe¢ cient on cognitive
ability is statistically signi￿cant (p<0.0001). To account for the sample being twins,
standard errors are clustered using the general estimating equation framework of Liang
and Zeger (1986). Depending on which controls are included, moving up one standard
deviation in the distribution of cognitive ability is associated with a 7-10 point decrease
in beauty contest choice. We have also evaluated the same speci￿cations with the score of
cognitive ability decomposed into the three test subcomponents of numerical, analytical
and logical reasoning, and each of the individual scores are signi￿cantly correlated with
behavior. These results are reported in Table II.
The relationship between cognitive ability and beauty contest is robust as it remains
highly signi￿cant in all speci￿cations. Beauty contest choice shows a statistically signif-
icant increase along with subject age. There is no statistically signi￿cant relationship
between sex and beauty contest choice. Education, de￿ned as having some college ed-
ucation, is signi￿cantly correlated with choices that are closer to Nash. In column 6,
we report the results from a regression with dummy variables for all seven educational
categories. The dummy variables are not jointly signi￿cant (p=0.15).
Our results are consistent with the cognitive hierarchy models and with Nagel￿ s depth
of reasoning explanation for beauty contest behavior (Camerer, Ho and Chong 2004; Nagel
1995). To explore this we divide beauty contest choices into four categories with break
points at 100pn, for n = 1, 2, and 3 (see Figure II). Among subjects in the lowest quartile
of cognitive ability, just under half chose numbers over 50, while under 10% make choices
below 12.5. This behavior is reversed among those in the top quartile of cognitive ability
10with almost no choices above 50, and more than one-third making choices of under 12.5.
IV DISCUSSION
We ￿nd that the ￿ distance to Nash equilibrium￿in a beauty contest is negatively corre-
lated with cognitive ability. This relationship suggests an explicit role for mental ability
and e⁄ort that is not captured in the traditional economic model of decision making. Our
subjects appear to struggle to ￿nd the Nash equilibrium, utilize conscious cognitive abili-
ties, and are heterogeneous. As in previous studies of the beauty contest, very few people
in our sample conform to the Nash prediction, and choices range from the equilibrium of
0 all the way to the maximum allowed choice of 100. The mean choice in our study is
34.12, versus the unique Nash equilibrium of 0, and the winning choice of 17.06.
The results are consistent with our hypothesis that ￿nding Nash equilibrium in the
beauty contest requires the mobilization of scarce and costly cognitive resources. The
deviations from Nash equilibrium are strongly negatively associated with cognitive ability.
As shown in Figure II, the relationship is so direct that people in the bottom quartile
of cognitive ability appear to choose randomly, whereas people in the top quartile, on
average, make choices that are very close to the winning number of just over 17. A
one standard deviation increase in cognitive ability is associated with playing 7-10 points
closer to Nash equilibrium. These results are robust to alternate explanations based in
education, sex, and age.
Cognitive ability may play two complementary roles in producing lower beauty con-
test entries. First, an individual￿ s ability to calculate equilibrium may be a function of
cognitive resources. Second, cognitive ability may be associated with a better ability to
form accurate beliefs about others. Indeed, a striking feature of the data is that subjects
11in the top decile provide, on average, a number very near the revenue maximizing choice.
On average, these people behave as if they correctly predict the bias of others. If this
￿nding generalized then in mixed populations of rational and ￿ behavioral￿agents, one can
imagine the endogenous evolution of institutions which permit rational types to system-
atically exploit the biases of the more behavioral types (Glaeser, 2004; Levitt and List,
2007). For example, there is evidence that sports clubs design contract options to pro￿t
from consumer irrationality (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006).
Our results are in general agreement with non-beauty contest studies reporting that
behavioral anomalies are more common among subjects with low cognitive ability scores
(Benjamin and Brown 2006; Dohmen et al. 2007; Frederick 2005). Furthermore, we
believe that these experimental settings are cognitively simple as compared to many im-
portant economic decisions that people must make. If people have trouble ￿nding Nash
equilibrium in an experimental beauty contest, one ought not be too surprised if some
people have di¢ culty navigating ￿nancial markets or making good career or mate choice
decisions.
Clearly, human behavior in the beauty contest is inconsistent with any purist assump-
tion that all individuals behave "as if" rationally. In this particular situation, such an
assumption is not a useful abstraction and obscures an important source of behavioral
heterogeneity. The robust correlation between cognitive ability and behavior in the beauty
complements theoretical work aimed at explaining the failure to observe Nash equilibrium
(e.g. Camerer, Ho and Chong 2004). In such models, there is a distribution of the num-
ber steps of iterated strategic reasoning players are capable of engaging in. Our results
suggest that individual di⁄erences in cognitive ability can explain why some individuals
are more strategically sophisticated than others. Cognitive limitations are, we believe, a
major contributing factor to the failure to observe equilibrium. When the ￿as if￿fails
12to make accurate predictions, we agree with Herbert Simon in favoring economic models
that assume people have such cognitive limitations (Simon 1955).
The economic signi￿cance of behavioral anomalies observed in the laboratory is under
active debate. For example, Ken Binmore argues against taking experimental evidence
uncritically, suggesting that people get to equilibrium ￿by an interactive process of trial-
and-error learning￿ (Binmore 1999). This experiential process may be quite di⁄erent
from standard views of rationality, but in repeated settings may converge to the standard
behavior. In fact, with experience, beauty contest behavior generally converges toward
the equilibrium.
Beyond experience, a form of selection may also limit the economic costs of behavioral
anomalies. A series of papers concludes that people who are in a market frequently tend to
behave as predicted by standard economic theory (List 2003). As noted by Gary Becker,
persistent failures in the laboratory to make, for example, accurate probability judgments
only matter if people in the ￿eld make the same mistakes (Clement 2002). For instance,
it is possible that people who self-select into professions where calculating probabilities
is important (e.g., professional traders) might be above average in the abilities that are
relevant. Thus, a variety of institutional factors may serve to mitigate the extent to which
behavioral anomalies persist in the real world (Levitt and List, 2007).
Others argue, however, that behavioral anomalies can persist despite ample scope
for learning (Alevy, Haigh and List 2007; Mullainathan and Thaler 2001), and in some
settings irrationality at the individual level can be magni￿ed, not mitigated, at the group
level (Fehr and Tyran 2005). Finally, Richard Thaler has critiqued the view that learning
and selection minimize the relevance of behavior anomalies, noting that some of the most
important decisions such as career choice, marriage partner, and number of children do
not easily allow for trial-and-error learning or selection (Thaler 2000).
13Returning to the high-level question of the human brain and the billiards player, one
might ask why people should be expected to be rational decision-makers. An obvious
answer is that evolution by natural selection should favor good problem solvers over bad.
Furthermore, if natural selection is the shaping force for producing good decision making
machinery, there is no reason to limit the outcome to conscious cognition.
Myriad animal studies provide support for the idea that natural selection does favor,
and produce, organisms with remarkably sophisticated behaviors. For example, dung￿ ies,
Scatophaga sterocoraria, exhibit Nash equilibrium behavior when they compete for re-
sources in a war of attrition (Hendricks and Wilson 1988; Maynard Smith and Price
1973; Parker 1970). The ￿eld of behavioral ecology is ￿lled with thousands of speci￿c
demonstrations that animals exhibit behavior that is completely consistent with the ￿as
if￿assumption of economics (Daly and Wilson 1983; Krebs and Davies 1996).
How does one reconcile smart ￿ ies and silly people? If natural selection favors opti-
mizing behavior, and organisms with tiny brains perform the lightening calculations, why
do we ￿nd in this beauty contest study that only the people with highest cognitive ability
behave optimally? Put di⁄erently, there is a sense in which our proposed explanation of
the puzzling failure to arrive costlessly to the Nash equilibrium merely solves one puzzle
by creating another one. The computational complexity of ￿nding the Nash equilibrium
by iterated dominance is utterly trivial compared to some of the much more computation-
ally challenging tasks of which humans seem capable. For example, humans are endowed
with face recognition capacities that exceed that outperform most computers, and hu-
mans also have very e⁄ective cheater detection mechanisms (Cosmides and Tooby 1992).
This interpretation is consistent with recent evidence that dominance violations are much
rarer when games are framed in a manner that is designed to be more ￿ natural￿(Chou et
al. 2007).
14These results are consistent with understanding that natural selection works on the
decision making machinery, not directly on behavior. This distinction between the un-
derlying selective pressure for optimal behavior and the speci￿c mechanisms that produce
behavior became a central aspect of ethology in the second half of the 20th century (Mayr
1961; Tinbergen 1963, 1968). The distinction between the force of natural selection, and
its rei￿cation in bodies and brains, is that the sophisticated machinery that evolved to
optimize can produce behavior that seems irrational or, at the other extreme, behavior
that is ￿ better than rational￿(Cosmides and Tooby 1994). This view suggests that ani-
mals, including humans, can look silly or smart depending on the relationship between the
current context and the environment that shaped the relevant mental machinery (Bowlby
1969; Irons 1998).
Cognitive overrides may be utilized when more automatic decision-making machinery
favors costly behavior. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the need for conscious, cognitive
involvement rises along with divergence between modern and ancestral problems. Just
as dung￿ ies are naturally good at solving ancestral problems, the role of cognitive ability
in human economic behavior may be less important for ancient problems and greater
for evolutionarily novel problems. For example, face recognition is an important part of
reputation management, and the modulation of social exchange is a problem that has
very deep evolutionary roots (Cosmides and Tooby 1992, Trivers 1971). Accordingly, we
hypothesize that social exchange mechanisms such as face recognition or cheater detection
will exhibit low correlation with cognitive ability.
In summary, we believe the billiard player￿ s ￿as if￿ is a useful abstraction for the
function of the human brain in some situations. We are intrigued by the possibility of
creating a framework for the likely usefulness of this simpli￿ed approach.
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22VI Tables and Figures
Table I. Dependent Variable: Beauty Contest Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Ability -9.67** -8.66** -9.47** -8.81** -7.61** -7.57**
(0.92) (0.95) (0.96) (1.01) (1.04) (1.07)
Age (in yrs) - 0.50** - - 0.48** 0.50**
- (0.13) - - (0.13) (0.14)
1 if female - - 2.53 - 2.46 1.96
- - (2.24) - (2.28) (2.26)
1 if college educated - - - -4.68* -4.88* -
- - - (2.17) (2.17) -
Educ Dummies? NO NO NO NO NO YES
Constant 34.04** 17.66** 32.03** 37.22** 19.84** -
(0.95) (4.15) (1.96) (1.82) (4.68) -
Observations 656 656 656 656 642 642
R2 0.165 0.187 0.166 0.171 0.195 0.202
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses., clustered at the family level.
* signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1%.
23Table II. Dependent Variable: Beauty Contest Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Numerical -3.41** -2.80** -3.29** -3.11** -2.41** -2.44**
(0.92) (0.95) (0.96) (1.01) (1.04) (1.07)
Analytical -5.94** -5.35** -5.80** -5.44** -4.74** -4.58**
(1.13) (1.13) (1.14) (1.13) (1.13) (1.15)
Logical -3.10** -3.02** -3.16** -2.84** -2.88** -2.81**
(1.01) (1.00) (1.01) (1.05) (1.05) (1.04)
Age (in yrs) - 0.48** - - 0.47** 0.48**
- (0.13) - - (0.13) (0.14)
1 if female - - 1.80 - 1.62 1.47
- - (2.23) - (2.28) (2.25)
1 if college educated - - - -4.45* -4.30* -
- - - (2.15) (2.16) -
Educ Dummies? NO NO NO NO NO YES
Constant 34.05** 18.34** 32.62** 37.05** 20.36** -
(0.94) (4.23) (1.97) (1.78) (4.84) -
Observations 656 656 656 656 642 642
R2 0.170 0.191 0.171 0.175 0.196 0.204
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses., clustered at the family level.
* signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1%.
24Figure I. Beauty Contest Entry and cognitive ability (by
decile), 95 % standard error bars are shown.
25Figure II. "Depth of reasoning" and cognitive ability. We divide
beauty contest choices into four categories with break points at 100pn,
for n = 1, 2, and 3.
26VII Appendix A￿Instructions (translated from
Swedish)
￿In this section you will take part in a guessing contest. Your task is to guess a number
between 0 and 100. All participants of this study will be asked to provide a guess (several
hundred people take part in the study). The person whose guess is closest to half the
average guess will win 1000 SEK (for instance, if the average guess is 50, the person whose
guess is closest to 25 will win the 1000 SEK). Please indicate your guess below.￿
27